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Moving in a hierarchized landscape
Changing border regimes in Central Kalimantan
DAVE LUMENTA
Abstract
Transnational mobility is a common feature among borderland communities. 
Central Borneo has been a relatively fluid and open riverine-based socio-
cultural and economic space since the arrival of colonial states, without much 
interference from the establishment of international boundaries on local cross-
border mobility practices. This applies to the Kenyah, a cluster of related ethnic 
groups occupying the Apokayan plateau in East Kalimantan (Indonesia), who are 
historically an integral part of the socio-cultural and economic fabric throughout 
the major riverine systems of Sarawak (Malaysia). Despite the relative absence 
of states, Central Borneo has not escaped the onslaught of social differentiation 
embedded in nation-state identities. The penetration of Sarawak’s logging 
industry has brought the terrestrial re-ordering of the Bornean landscape away 
from the relative egalitarian social order of river basins into hierarchical social 
relations embedded in capitalistic modes of production. This has brought about 
the construction of the Kenyah’s visibility as an “Indonesian underclass“ inside 
Sarawak.
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Introduction
Strategically situated on the major maritime trade routes linking ancient 
Europe, India, and China, Southeast Asia has a long dynamic history marked 
by shifting powers and the intense movements of people, commodities, and 
cultural flows. The region’s fluidity and openness is amply demonstrated 
by an abundance of shared cross-cultural influences within the region, 
such as technology, religious syncretism, language, diasporas, and even the 
consumption and preparation of food. 
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The arrival of colonialism and the subsequent emergence of post-colonial 
nation-states in the region have significantly re-configured and re-ordered 
patterns of human social life. Border regimes have become prominent actors 
in the regulation of the movement of peoples and commodities across borders, 
such as the establishment of customs and immigration control posts, and 
designated international routes and ports of entry. Coinciding with regional 
economic booms, the importance of border regimes has only increased 
among the ASEAN states in the mid-1980s in the wake of increased trans-
national labour migrations. However, departing from Bauman (1998), the 
recent structure of globalization also comes with new class dimensions and 
hierarchies that segregate the flow of peoples around the world, made possible 
by sophisticated regimes and the technology of border controls. 
Nevertheless, numerous upland regions across mainland Southeast Asia, 
peripheral maritime regions such as the Sulu Sea, the Celebes Sea, and the 
internationally-partitioned island of Borneo, remain quasi-open and fluid 
spaces where peoples and commodities traverse international boundaries 
relatively unchecked by border controls. This indicates that states rarely reach 
a state of idealized omnipotence enabling them to wield total and coherent 
power over space and societal mobility. This is especially true for post-colonial 
states, not only in the ASEAN region, but also around the world. State borders 
throughout Southeast Asia have generally been established in an arbitrary 
fashion, where ethnic, linguistic, social, and economic borders never neatly 
coincided with formal state boundaries drawn on maps. Consequently, 
shared ethnicity, language, identity, and economic interconnectivity continue 
to transcend state boundaries. As such, in many upland borderland regions 
around Southeast Asia the nation-state remains an alien and contested notion 
(see Scott 2009; Van Schendel 2005).
This does not imply that national identities have made no inroads in 
these seemingly “stateless” and “unruly” backyards. Since the 1980s, even 
a remote but culturally fluid region like Central Borneo has not escaped the 
diverging onslaught of national identity inscriptions between ‘Indonesians’ 
and ‘Malaysians’. The focus of this article is that this has been achieved not 
through the increased sophistication of state border controls, but rather by 
hierarchies created by the capitalist transformation of the Central Bornean 
landscape.
The history of Kenyah mobility from the Apokayan highlands (in today’s 
Indonesia) into Sarawak (today’s Malaysia) provides a dramatic, if not tragic, 
example of how an ethnic group gradually became alienated from Sarawak’s 
social and economic fabric of which they were an integrated and significant 
part. Instead of attributing this ‘success’ to effective border control, the power 
of national schooling, or even to the outcome of international conflicts like 
the Konfrontasi which was actually experienced as a full-scaled war in Central 
Borneo, my final examination looks at the capitalist-based structural ordering 
of the Sarawak space itself, which has been an effective substitution for any 
organizational state power in bringing about a visible social demarcation 
between ”Indonesians” and ”Malaysians” in Central Borneo. 
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Theoretical setting
One major theme in the discussion of border regimes revolves around 
two dialectical historical trajectories – partitionary nation-state building that 
calls for spatial partition and the sedentarization of peoples on one hand and 
capitalist-driven globalization calling for open borders to facilitate unhindered 
circulation of capital and labour on the other.1
Nation-state spaces operate on the principle of fixity and bounded 
homogeneity. Indeed, states are inherently obsessed with tying people to 
specific places and to assign them coherent identities, in other words, to turn 
them into “geobodies” (for example, Scott 1998; Migdal 2004; Thongchai 
Winichakul 1994). States are inherently constructed to function as spatial 
barriers, but capitalism continuously strives to do away with spatial barriers 
(Marx 1973). Congruent to the latter, even traditional mobility practices and 
spatial orientation of the most remote communities throughout the world was 
often tied to efforts in seeking shorter and more favourable trade routes to the 
nearest markets. The persistent mobility practices in borderland regions in 
defiance of today’s state boundaries are often rooted in ancient trade routes 
that may have been the most efficient links between supply regions to regional 
markets. These very same routes may be as efficient today as they were in the 
past, and serving the same purposes under contemporary capitalist modes of 
development as they had been under maritime-trade regimes of the ancient 
past. During the early stages of mercantilist capitalism in Southeast Asia, 
colonial powers suppressed traditional mobility practices such as trading 
expeditions precisely because they were all too compatible with and responsive 
to the demands of the capitalist system itself – bypassing trade monopolies, 
colonial tax barriers, and inefficient trading routes.2 Up to this point, because 
each has their own logic of space, it appears that capitalism and people who 
freely move around are not conveniently compatible with state projects. 
Marxist geography (for example, Lefebvre 1991; Smith 1990) particularly 
focuses on the mechanisms through which space is appropriated – how it 
is constructed, visualized, designated, seized, and projected back – to serve 
capital (or class) interests. In order to overcome natural barriers in order 
to accelerate the extraction of resources, the re-organization of space is a 
pre-requisite. The invention of new modes of production, technology, and 
collaboration with states enables the speedy re-configuration of landscapes 
to accelerate the efficient movement of resources from their natural deposits 
to markets. Terrestrial developmentalism has been a major undertaking 
throughout the world. The invention of roads, logging roads, ports, dams, 
towns, the sedentarization of human settlements, and transmigration schemes 
are all manifestations of the capital drive to subjugate the landscape. These 
1  Ishikawa (2008), for example, referred to these two forces as “the organizational 
power of the state“ and “the structural power of capitalism“.
2  For example, the diaspora of Bugis merchants towards the Malacca Strait was 
at a certain stage the direct result of Dutch efforts to surpress direct trading links between 
Makassar and British merchants, which undermined Dutch trading interests in the region (see 
Poelinggomang 2002).
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inventions are expected to create embedded social structures that are expected 
to conform to the maximization of capital accumulation. This includes, for 
example, the importation of labour, the creation of middle class suburbs, and 
even the forced displacements of peoples. The latter section of the examination 
of the history of Kenyah mobility deals especially with the effects of the logging 
industry and how it has altered and impacted not only on the landscape, but 
also on new modes of social relations.
Riverine spaces: Central Kalimantan’s past social, 
economic, and political organization
Trans-basin trade and interethnic social interactions and migrations have 
been constant features of social organization among Central Borneo’s 
communities (Rousseau 1990; Sellato 2001; Eghenter 1999). Rousseau (1990: 
301-302) suggests that Central Borneo societies can be better analysed when 
seen as river basin societies rather than as closed village units. Rousseau’s 
model can be applied to transnational trans-basin societies to analyse Central 
Borneo groups that have extensive trans-basin relations under the current 
international partition (Figure 1). 
In general, State borders throughout Southeast Asia have been established 
in an arbitrary fashion, where formal state boundaries drawn on maps never 
Figure 1. Trans-basin society (Rousseau 1990).
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neatly intersected with ethnic, linguistic, social, and economic borders. As a 
result, shared ethnicity, language, identity, and economic interconnectivity 
continue to transcend many state boundaries. 
The island of Borneo (Map 1) is not only a fitting example of these arbitrary 
state partitioning processes (being partitioned into three different nation-
states), but it serves as an ideal site of inquiry to examine the seemingly absence 
of state border regimes and the far penetrating effects of the capitalist re-
ordering of the landscape. 
Map 1. Research site: Central Borneo.
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The colonial partitioning of Borneo by the 1891 Anglo-Dutch Boundary 
Agreement was primarily based on the division of the river basins.3 It soon 
became evident that the mere division and control over river basins did not 
effectively bring about the smooth integration of the societies living in these 
basins into the sphere of (nation) states consistent with the partition agreement. 
The international boundary did little to curb Apokayan Kenyah mobility 
into Sarawak. In fact, continuing trade with Sarawak was a major income for 
the Kenyah enabling them to pay Dutch door-taxes. The dismal possibilities 
for integrating the Apokayan’s economy into the Dutch and subsequent 
Indonesian space have so far rendered the region an economic liability, and 
each successive Dutch and Indonesian governments tacitly acknowledged 
that the Apokayan’s economic survival rests largely on profits and revenues 
generated from neighbouring Sarawak.4
This inquiry focuses on a continuous geographical and social space that 
I will loosely define as Central Borneo, which encompasses parts of the 
Malaysian State of Sarawak and the Indonesian province of East Kalimantan. 
This region constitutes a transnational socio-cultural continuum that is rooted 
in the continuing flows of peoples, commodities, and ideas between the river 
basins for at least three centuries. 
Social and economic trans-basin relationships between present day 
Kalimantan and Sarawak, characterized by inter-basin westward oriented 
trade towards the South China Sea – hence, through Sarawak – was a feature 
that existed before the arrival of colonial states in Borneo. Forest and animal 
products such as gutta percha, India rubber, rhinoceros horns, bezoars 
stones and later eaglewood primarily catered for Chinese market demands 
throughout Southeast Asia. Social networks surrounded these chains of 
commodity flows, which in turn determined the mobility orientation of many 
interior peoples in Central Borneo towards the South China Sea (see Ooi Keat 
Gin 1997). This explains why many borderland communities in present-day 
West and East Kalimantan on the Indonesian side of the border maintain close 
social affinities with riverine communities in Sarawak. In addition, the absence 
of a hegemonic Sultanate on Sarawak’s coastal estuaries may also have been 
an attraction for the trade to flow westward. This is in sharp contrast with 
Borneo’s east coast where coastal Sultanates like Kutai, Bulungan, and Berau 
heavily taxed commodities entering from the interior. For example, as our 
case study will demonstrate, the Kenyah of the Apokayan were particularly 
reluctant, if not defiant, to Dutch efforts in the early twentieth century to re-
orient their trading activities eastwards, away from Sarawak (Elshout 1923).
Colonial Sarawak (1841-1946) under the regimes of three successive 
‘White Rajahs’ (James Brooke, Charles Brooke, and Charles Vyner Brooke) 
sits as an anomaly among its colonial contemporaries. Compared to British 
and Dutch colonies elsewhere in the region, Sarawak was immensely poor 
3  See “Convention between Great Britain and the Netherlands defining boundaries in 
Borneo - Signed at London, June 20, 1891” in Staatsblad van het Koninkrijk der Nederlanden.
4  Lumenta (2008: 112-132).
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in terms of mineral deposits (oil was only discovered in the 1920s) and soil 
fertility. Lacking significant export revenues, Sarawak’s bureaucracy was 
small and underfunded. As a result, its style of governance was largely 
personal and informal, enabling Sarawak officials to have close rapport with 
their indigenous subjects. Viewing themselves as the protectors of the status 
quo of the ”native” traditional ways of life, the Brookes resisted any attempt 
to bring Sarawak under the influence of land-hungry British plantation 
capitalists. They believed that loss of native lands to capital interests would 
bring turmoil to Sarawak. The sole solution to Sarawak’s dire economic 
situation was to promote the free trade of jungle products – which the Brookes 
believed would bring a sensible and non-destructive pace of ”civilization” 
to the native ethnic groups in Sarawak.5 This also led to Brooke policies, as 
subsequent sections below will illustrate, that were relatively liberal towards 
the influx of indigenous trade expeditions coming from across the border. The 
British colonial period inherited the liberal attitudes towards the Apokayan 
Kenyah from the Brooke period. The formation of Malaysia in 1963 and 
the resulting Indonesia-Malaysia Confrontation initiated an evolutionary 
process of disciplining the influx of Indonesians into Sarawak, reaching its 
apex in 1985 after Indonesia and Malaysia formalized procedures for border 
crossings and when Malaysia initiated nationwide raids targeting ”illegals”. 
The Apokayan Kenyah were relatively less affected due to the absence of state 
border controls in central Borneo, although the new attitudes of the Malaysian 
state significantly limited their mobility space to the interior. Simultaneously, 
Sarawak’s logging industry penetrated the Central Borneo highlands since 
the late 1980s, bringing along the construction of roads and job opportunities 
for the Indonesian populace across the border in Kalimantan.
The history of Kenyah mobility from East Kalimantan to 
Sarawak (1900-2007)
The Kenyah, an umbrella ethnic identity for several culturally, historically, and 
linguistically related swidden agricultural groups, constitutes the majority of 
the population in Central Borneo. The largest cluster of Kenyah settlements 
is found in the Apokayan highlands in today’s East Kalimantan Province in 
Indonesia adjacent to the Sarawak border. Being strategically located at the 
headwaters of major river basins that flow from the Apokayan-Iran highlands 
in centrifugal directions to Borneo’s west and east coasts, the Kenyah played 
a central role in bringing forest products (and later agricultural labour) from 
the interior to downstream commercial centers. This was undertaken through 
a traditional mobility practice, principally undertaken by men, called peselai 
(literally ‘to go on a long journey’ - or ‘merantau’ in Malay), previously rooted in 
both head hunting and trade expeditions. The social significance of peselai was 
to initiate the coming of age of men by elders, while the economic significance 
lay in the provision of much-sought lowland commodities that could not be 
5  See Reece 1988; Ooi Keat Gin 1997.
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procured locally, such as salt, beads, iron, and much later, outboard engines, 
medicines, chainsaws, and money. Peselai expeditions often functioned 
as political missions to negotiate the opening of new trading routes with 
neighbouring ethnic groups, and on a broader scale, helped to deepen the 
relationships between the Apokayan Kenyah with communities of different 
river systems, particularly in Sarawak. No less important was that this also 
led to the flow of cultural ideas from the Apokayan.6 
The transformation of peselai expeditions and its changing contexts reflect 
the socio-economic inclusion of the Kenyah within Sarawak during the Brooke 
period up to their current state/corporate-driven socio-economic exclusion 
and alienation from Sarawak.
Prelude: the early Brooke years
Brooke pacification policies gradually produced successful outcomes along 
the Rajang river basin and were immediately followed by the establishment 
of bazaar centers that sprung up around forts like Kapit (1879) and Belaga 
(1884), where Malay and Chinese traders lost no time to seize opportunities to 
barter coastal commodities such as belacu (crude unbleached cotton), tobacco, 
beads, salt, and sugar with much-valued forest products extracted by upriver 
communities, such as geliga (bezoar stones), gutta percha, jelutong (wild rubber), 
India-rubber, and rhinoceros horns.7 
In January 1884, the Brooke Resident of Sarawak’s Third (Rajang) Division, 
Hugh Brooke-Low reported the presence of the Apokayan Kenyah in Sarawak, 
when a small band of Leppo’ Tau and Leppo’ Tepu Kenyah sub-groups from 
the Apokayan ‘stirred trouble and took heads’ in the Tubau area, by then an 
important trading hub for Brunei merchants near Belaga. Brooke-Low also 
reported that the Leppo’ Timai Kenyah were at the time contemplating to 
migrate from the Apokayan to the Balleh River in order to evade the Balui 
Kayan hostilities they often faced on their routes to trading outposts along 
the Rajang River.8 He had earlier reported about these troubles on the Balui 
route when 31 persons were killed during raidings between Balui Kayans and 
the Kenyah from the Apokayan.9 
Further evidence also shows that trading expeditions from the Apokayan 
to the Rajang and Baram river basins were often impeded by frequent Iban 
6  More on Peselai see Elshout 1923; Whittier 1973; Jessup 1981; Lumenta 2008.
7  Charles Brooke initially established both Kapit (1879) and Belaga (1884) as military 
frontier posts to check and curb Iban migratory expansions and headhunting raids to the Upper 
Rajang and Upper Balleh rivers. See Maxwell (1999) on the establishment Belaga, and Pringle 
(1970: 255n-257n) for a history of Brooke’s policies pertaining to Iban expansion in the Rajang 
and Balleh rivers. On the general role of Chinese pioneers in the Sarawak trade, see Chew 
(1990). See also Eghenter (2001) and Ooi Keat Gin (1997) on the history of traded items.
8  Sarawak Gazette 2 June 1884. It must be noted that the Apokayan was de facto not a 
territorial part of any colonial power before 1911. On Tubau, see N. Ishikawa and M. Ishikawa 
(2005). The Tubau area by then functioned as an important trading hub for Brunei merchants.
9  Sarawak Gazette 2 August 1882.
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ambushes making both trading routes unsafe.10 Despite the widespread 
hostilities between the Apokayan and communities along Sarawak’s rivers, 
Brooke residents noted that the Apokayan Kenyah (who at the time consisted 
among others of the Uma’ Kulit, Lepo’ Tau, Badeng sub-groups) were keen 
to trade with Sarawak bazaars, and that this might be the key to establishing 
peace in Sarawak’s upriver regions. On a head taking incident in 1889 between 
the Uma’ Kulit Kenyah from the Apokayan with upriver Sarawak Ibans, C.A. 
Bampfylde, Resident of the Third (Rajang) Division reported:
Upriver Affairs. - From Belaga fort I received news that Pingan Sorang had imposed 
a very heavy fine on the Uma Kulits of Batang Kayan, but whether this fine has been 
paid or not is unknown: several young up-river Dyaks having expressed their intention 
of going on the war path against these Uma Kulits were promptly stopped by the 
chiefs. (C.A. Bampfylde, Resident Third Division, 1 April 1889).11
This quoted report indicates that Brooke officials were aware that PeIngan 
Surang, the paramount chief of the Leppo’ Tau Kenyah of the Apokayan, 
exerted political influence over other Apokayan groups. 
In 1897, the Leppo’ Tau Kenyah appealed for peace to the Baram Resident, 
Charles Hose, in order to establish friendly relations and to open trading 
opportunities with communities along the Baram. Hose personally went to 
broker the peace deal by involving the Badeng Kenyah, who were on good 
terms with both the Kayan and Kenyah communities along the Baram and the 
Leppo’ Tau Kenyah of the Apokayan, to act as peace mediators. The following 
passage exemplifies the ”Brooke approach” to the Apokayan problem:
Whilst in the Madang villages I met a party of Keniahs from the Batang Kayan river, 
who had been sent by Tama Kuling and Tama Poyang, the Leppu Tau and Uma 
Kulit Chiefs, to inform me, that they were anxious to visit the people of Baram, and 
to meet me at Claudetown, with the intention of making friends with the people of 
this district and those of the Batang Kayan. They are also anxious to find an outlet 
for their trade. I consulted with Tama Bulan and the other chiefs present, and we 
decided to send presents of gongs and white cloth to several of the Batang Kayan 
chiefs. (Charles Hose, Resident Fifth Division, 1899).12
On another occasion, one Uma’ Kulit Kenyah envoy was reported visiting the 
Kapit Resident, upon which the latter reported,
Although at present they have no intention of moving from their present abodes in 
the Batang Kayan, these people are very anxious to establish friendly relations with 
... especially the Dyaks of the Batang Rejang. I am therefore affording them every 
opportunity to meet the principal Dyak chiefs ... The Uma Kulits are disirous [sic] 
to be able to trade with and obtain their supplies from Sarawak territory in future 
10  See Nieuwenhuis (1929: 32) who wrote, based on his 1900 visit, that “On their trading 
trips to the river Batang-Redjang and the river Barom [original] they had hitherto always been ambushed 
by Hiwans of these parts”.
11  Sarawak Gazette 1 August 1899.
12  Sarawak Gazette 3 January 1899.
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and say they will gladly welcome Dyak forest products seekers. (H.F. Deshon, Kapit 
Resident, 1898). 13
Charles Brooke’s personal invitation in 1899 to meet and persuade PeIngan 
Surang to move the Apokayan Kenyah over to Sarawak should be seen in 
the context of the ongoing hostilities between upriver communities. PeIngan 
Surang reached Kapit and Sibu in March 1900 with a group of 500 Kenyah who 
reportedly traded high quality gutta percha and India rubber in exchange for 
salt and other goods, valued at ”thousands of dollars”.14 Another party led by 
Bui Jalong went down the Baram River to Claudetown (Marudi) near Brunei. 
Charles Brooke took the opportunity to invite both parties to a conference in 
Kuching, where PeIngan Sorang stated that they found the Rajang markets 
”more accessible and preferable” as long as peace with the Iban Dayaks, who 
were considered Brooke subjects, was maintained.15 The party returned to 
the Apokayan, soon finding themselves raided again by Ibans in the Upper 
Balleh.16
The establishment of the Kapit and Belaga bazaars provided the Apokayan 
Kenyah with alternative and shorter trade routes compared to the routes they 
used to take to the east, which were fraught with geographical obstacles, hostile 
relations with Mahakam Bahaus, and the Kutai Sultanate’s trade monopoly 
over the Mahakam River.17 Moreover, access from the Apokayan to the lower 
Kayan near Tanjungselor (Bulungan) was, until the Dutch managed to broker 
peace in 1907, hampered by a hostile Uma Alim Kenyah settlement just above 
the Brem Brem rapids.18
The 1924  kapit  peacemaking  agreement  and the liberalization 
of human traffic
What really irritated both the Brooke and the Dutch Government were the 
ongoing, though sporadic, hostilities between Ibans of the Balleh and the 
Apokayan Kenyah, which reached a peak in 1921. Brooke officials took the 
effort to take the 350-mile roundtrip journey to Long Nawang to negotiate 
a peace settlement that would involve the Apokayan Kenyah, the Dutch 
controleur of the Apokayan and the Balleh Ibans. Brooke officers both knew 
that they would not arrive at a peacemaking settlement if the customs of only 
one warring party were observed and not those of the others. They travelled 
with a party of Balleh Ibans to Long Nawang to make preparations for a 
preliminary peacemaking agreement following Kenyah customs, overseen by 
both Brooke’s officials and the Dutch controleur Molenaar.19 The Long Nawang 
13  Sarawak Gazette 1 July 1898.
14  See Beccari (1904: 362). Beccari, an Italian naturalist, by mistake identified this Kenyah 
group for ‘Kayans’.
15  Sarawak Gazette 1 March 1901.
16  See Whittier (1973: 33-34) and Smythies (1955: 506-507).
17  See Whittier (1973) and Elshout (1923).
18  See Van Walchren (1907).
19  Eghenter (2001) noted that local Dutch controleurs of the Apokayan also favoured 
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peacemaking ceremony was concluded in May 1924, and both the Apokayan 
Kenyah and the Balleh Ibans agreed to a date when the next peacemaking 
ceremony would be undertaken following Iban customs.20
The Kapit peacemaking ceremony on 26 November 1924 was attended by 
Rajah Charles Vyner Brooke, the respective Brooke and Dutch officials and 
approximately 4,200 ”natives”, including the Apokayan Kenyah delegation 
consisting of 960 men who arrived in 97 canoes from the Apokayan. Charles 
Vyner Brooke himself came up to Kapit to oversee the proceedings and 
presented tokens of peace in the form of ancient jars to the Iban Penghulu Koh 
and the Kenyah paramount chief leader, Taman Kila. Apart from bringing 
permanent peace to Central Borneo, this move was also made for economic 
reasons. The agreement was hoped, in the words of G.T.M. MacBryan who 
organized the event, to 
[...] encourage freer intercourse between Sarawak and Dutch Borneo to the benefit 
of the inhabitants of these rivers, in that they will be able to proceed unmolested 
about their business, and open up the vast country of the Rajang head waters for the 
working of forest products and to peaceful trade (G.T.M. MacBryan, Sarawak Gazette 
1 October 1924).
Charles Vyner Brooke personally invited controleur Molenaar and the 
leading Apokayan chiefs to join him on his journey back to Kuching. The 
high appreciation the Brooke Government placed on the Kapit peacemaking 
agreement is expressed by the following letter the Sarawak Chief Secretary 
sent to the Dutch Government in Batavia:
Afterwards, on the invitation of His Highness the Rajah, Captain Molenaar brought 
some of the more important chiefs and their followers on to Kuching, the capital of 
Sarawak, where entertainment was provided for them. His Highness yacht was lent to 
them for the journey to and from Kuching ... His Highness wishes to express his keen 
appreciation of the excellent behaviour of the Kayans and Kenyahs under Captain 
Molenaar ... the Sarawak natives reciprocated in a remarkable way and it is thought 
that the Peace-making in itself will remain for a very long time in the memory of all 
who attended it, and that as a factor in the future prosperity on the Dutch - Sarawak 
Border it will have a far-reaching and beneficial effect.21
The Kapit peacemaking ceremony paved the way for the Apokayan Kenyah 
to gain unhindered access to Sarawak markets. In return, the Balleh Ibans 
were granted access to collect jungle products in Dutch Borneo. Through this 
liberalization of human traffic, the Apokayan Kenyah were able to increase 
their economic and social role in the Balui, Balleh and Rajang rivers.
The opening of oil fields near Miri and Kuala Baram, discovered in 
trade with Sarawak as opposed to central government efforts to divert trading activities into 
its own controlled territories. 
20  Sarawak Gazette 1 October 1924.
21  Politiek Verslag 24 December 1924, “Letter from the Chief Secretary of Sarawak on 
the Kapit peacemaking”, Nationaal Archief, Den Haag.
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the 1920s, required the mass recruitment of labour to clear coastal swamp 
forests.22 Kenyah peselai expeditions to the lower Baram were able to combine 
trading activities with wage-labour jobs.23 The following story typifies peselai 
expeditions in this period, as told by Lencau Bilong, who accordingly went 
on his first peselai just before the Second World War:
It was a difficult journey as there were no motorized boats at that time. We had to 
paddle up and haul our canoes through the rapids along the Iwan River for two weeks, 
leave our canoes at Long Adan and cross the Iran Mountains until we reached the 
Upper Danum River. We spent five days building new canoes. It took us another, 
maybe two weeks, until we reached the Upper Tiyut River. As we were running out 
of food stocks, we were desperate to find a nearby longhouse where we could find 
rice. However, a band of hostile Punans met us across the mountain at the headwaters 
of the Weng River. They had their blowpipes aimed at us. Only after we explained 
that we were Ngulo Arang’s grandchildren did they let us pass. (Lencau Bilong).24
The British colonial period: trade, culture, labour
During the immediate post-war years, expeditions resumed and expanded to 
the growing sawmill and logging industries along Sarawak’s coastal towns 
such as Binatang (Bintangor), Sibu, Sarikei, and the emerging town of Bintulu. 
The coastal areas were still an unknown world for many Kenyah, as the Bintulu 
District Officer reported in 1948:
On the 15th July, Penghulu Ovat Mereng came down from Tubau with thirty-two 
Kenyahs from Long Newang [original] Most of the Kenyahs had never seen the sea 
before. (Mr. Jacks, Bintulu District Officer, 1948).25 
The influx of peselai expeditions into Sarawak during this period were 
accompanied by flows of cultural ideas. The Apokayan in the late 1940s 
became the springboard for two new religions that successfully spread and 
won converts in Sarawak. 
Not long after the dawn of the Bungan cult, a reformist movement of the 
old Kenyah Adet Pu’un religion, peselai expedition members brought over the 
new Bungan cult to the neighboring Balui and Baram river systems in Sarawak. 
Around 1954, Bungan followers within peselai teams successfully attracted and 
converted Kayan and Kenyah communities along the Balui River, including 
influential Kayan longhouses near Belaga. The Bungan cult also spread 
rapidly during the 1950s in the Baram River and seriously undermined the 
missionary work of Catholic and BEM (Borneo Evangelical Mission) missions. 
Simultaneously, Christianity also spread into Sarawak’s Balui and Baram river 
systems through other peselai teams and both Apokayan and Bahau Kenyah 
migrants who had settled in Sarawak. Christian influence in the Balui started 
22  See also Amarjit Kaur (1998b: 127-128).
23  Interview with Lencau Bilong, Nawang Baru, May 2001 and February 2003.
24  Interview with Lencau Bilong, Nawang Baru, February 2003. Ngulo Arang was the 
chief of the Leppo’ Tau Kenyah in the Baram.
25  Sarawak Gazette 1 December 1948.
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with the migration of the Uma’ Kulit Kenyah from the Apokayan to Long Jawe. 
When BEM’s Rev. Ray Cunningham made his pioneering mission expedition 
to the Balui in 1952, he unexpectedly discovered that the most upriver Kenyah 
settlement had large numbers of Christians who had converted since their days 
in Indonesia. He recruited a number of Long Jawe Christians to assist mission 
work downstream.26 With the entrance of the Bungan cult and Christianity 
in Sarawak in the period 1952-1963, the Adet Pu’un rapidly lost its followers 
among Kayan and Kenyah villages throughout Sarawak. By 1962, all the 
villages in the Baram were either Bungan or Roman Catholic and almost the 
entire Balui valley was listed as ”Bungan” with the exception of two Christian 
Kenyah villages (Prattis 1963). It was also around this time that parts of the 
New Testament were translated in the Long Nawang Kenyah Leppo’ Tau 
dialect by peselai teams working at swamp timber sites in Suai. Pastor Balan 
Engan gives some more explanation of the origins of the Kenyah version of 
the New Testament (Tukat Madieng):
The Tukat Madieng was translated using the Indonesian Kenyah Leppo’ Tau dialect 
because the late Reverend Ray Cunningham, who proselytized among the Kenyah 
during the 1950s, had problems in finding local Sarawakian Kenyah who were willing 
to do the translations. They were maybe just too lazy and disinterested. He found 
willing Indonesian Kenyah workers at a timber camp near Miri – it was a camp in Suai. 
They all originated from Long Nawang, and they were all Leppo’ Tau. Cunningham 
lived in with these workers until the important passages of the Testament were 
translated. This happened around 1956. Of course, some church council members 
objected, saying that it should’ve been translated by morally qualified church members 
instead of filthy booze-drinking logging workers! But anyways, these workers had 
sufficient biblical knowledgeable that they knew how to translate it properly. These 
earlier translations were widely used before a new translation came out in 1978 – but 
it was mainly based on the earlier translations – so they kept the (Indonesian) Leppo’ 
Tau Kenyah dialect, which is widely understood anyways in Sarawak. (Pastor Balan 
Engan).27
Peselai group members would often spend their wages on various items that 
would be hauled all the way back to the Apokayan. Below is a typical scene 
of a returning peselai group, as described by the Kapit District Officer in 1957:
Six parties of USI [United States of Indonesia] Kenyahs comprising 91 men returned to 
Indonesian Borneo by the Tassoh-Majang path. They bought stoves with the money 
they made by working with some timber firms in Sibu. All appeared to have wrist-
watches and sewing machines and other stores totalled [sic] eight shoulder loads each 
to carry over a seven mile distance. All these people caused no trouble. (Hermanus 
Assan, Kapit District Officer, 1957).28
As the rubber and illipe nut (engkabang or tengkawang) trade boomed in 
Sarawak, more Kenyah groups entered the Rajang River during harvest 
26  Sidang Injil Borneo (1988: 26).
27  Interview with Pastor Balan Engan (SIB), Miri, October 2005.
28  1957 Kapit District report by District Officer Hermanus Assan (Sarawak Gazette 31 
March 1958).
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seasons as sharecroppers.29 Labour shortage in Sarawak’s Third Division 
(Rajang) became acute as Iban villages along the Rajang were unable to 
handle the simultaneous rice, para-rubber and illipe nut harvests in 1957-
1959 due to the absence of sufficient male Iban labour.30 This situation was 
further exacerbated when the Sarawak government requested additional 
labour to construct the Belaga airstrip in 1958. This problem was solved when 
approximately 500 Kenyah from the Apokayan arrived in Belaga to meet the 
labour shortage, while an additional 100 Kenyah arrived at Nanga Merirai by 
invitation of Temenggong Jugah to assist in weeding and harvesting. 
Evidence indicates that the implementation of the Pass Djalan policy was 
left to the discretion of resident officials, who apparently considered the legal 
issue of border crossing of secondary importance. For example, during the 1958 
mass recruitment of workers in Belaga, not all Kenyah possessed a valid Pass 
Djalan. Most of the Kenyah from Long Nawang recruited for the Belaga airstrip 
construction only had a Surat Keterangan (Recommendation Letter) signed by 
tua kampongs (village chiefs) instead of by the Wedana, rendering their entry 
illegal.31 District Residents, however, had more positive, if not liberal, views 
on the Kenyah influx, as the following passages written by District Officers 
in charge ex-officio over immigration affairs, illustrate
Labour was seriously in want. The shortage would have been worse were it not for 
the hundreds of Kenyahs from the U.S.I. [original] who plugged the gaps. (Hermanus 
Assan, Kapit District Officer, 1958).32 
Parties of Kenyahs have continued to arrive in the Baram. Good workers and excellent 
citizens they have caused no trouble of any kind. A few of the younger men marry 
and apply for permission to remain in Sarawak but otherwise there have been no 
requests to settle. (M.M. McSporran, Baram District Officer, 1959).33
Even officials who had reservations about the peselai influx were evidently more 
concerned with local impacts rather than questioning the legality of such influxes: 
The arrival of large numbers of Indonesian Kenyahs in Belaga en route to Kapit and the 
Lower Rejang presented a problem to longhouses on the Balui, who feel traditionally 
obligated to feed and house them. A party of forty migrant labourers held up in a 
longhouse for three or four days by high water is a burden on any small community. 
(W.C.B. Wilson, Kapit District Officer, 1959).34
29  Illipe nut harvests peaked throughout Sarawak in 1954 and 1958, coinciding with 
soaring Illipe nut prices since 1953. See B.E. Smythies’ report on the uses of illipe nuts in Sarawak 
Gazette (31 August 1958: 146-148). 
30  Many Ibans in the Kapit Division were recruited into the Sarawak Rangers fighting 
Communism in Malaya, in addition to those who headed towards Seria in Brunei to work 
on the oil refineries. As the Kapit resident reported in 1957, Iban male labour absence in his 
division reached levels of up to 40 % of the total Iban male population. (Sarawak Gazette 31 
March 1958).
31  See Sarawak Gazette 31 May 1959: 113. On the invalidity of a Surat Keterangan, see 
Sarawak Gazette 30 November 1958: 222.
32  1958 Kapit District Report (Sarawak Gazette 31 May 1959: 114).
33  1959 Baram District Report (Sarawak Gazette 31 October 1959: 247).
34  1959 Kapit District Report (Sarawak Gazette 31 May 1960: 119).
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In fact, in District Officer reports the influx of Kenyah workers remained 
reported until 1964 under “Native Issues” rather than in the ”Immigration” 
sections. Peselai teams working at the Belaga airfield in 1958 brought significant 
influences of Christianity and Kenyah art forms to nearby Badeng Kenyah 
villages, such as Long Geng.35 Upon hearing of their presence at the Belaga 
airfield project, Tom Harrisson, the Curator of the Sarawak Museum (1946-
1966) in Kuching, invited several of his old Kenyah friends that he knew 
from his days in Long Nawang to Kuching and commissioned them to make 
artwork for the Sarawak Museum. As Harrisson (1966: page) wrote:
The Leppo Tau Kenyahs of Long Nawang, upper (Apo) Batang Kayan, Kalimantan, are 
regarded by all other Kenyahs as the top “class”, the repository of the “purest” form 
of their culture and the centre of their oldest and most important cultural aristocracy. 
The symbol of this situation when I visited Long Nawang in 1945 as the great “Tree 
of Life” painted on the wall of the magnificent house used for communal meetings 
and rites. That house has since decayed and never been rebuilt, but I succeeded in 
getting the original artists to come to Kuching later and reproduced the same superb 
design for living inside the Sarawak Museum –though there is not room here to do 
it at a full-scale.
It took nearly two years to finish the commission and the murals were only 
completed in 1960. PeBit Ncuk along with Tusau Padan were commissioned to 
make traditional Kenyah carvings for display in the museum and to contribute 
articles about Leppo’ Tau Kenyah traditions in the Sarawak Museum Journal.36 
Tusau Padan became a renowned Kenyah artist throughout Sarawak, and 
he opted to settle there permanently.37 Harrisson also recruited other young 
peselai members to help with the excavation of the Museum’s Batu Niah Cave 
project. This particular period illustrates the centrality of the Apokayan to 
important religious transformations occurring in upriver Sarawak, as well as 
the inclusionary attitudes of the Sarawak state towards the Apokayan Kenyah. 
It similarly marked the last phase of peselai expeditions into Sarawak when 
they were not yet seen as ”illegal” or as ”Indonesians”.
The Long Jawe incident and konfrontasi (1963-1966)
Political and security tensions began to build-up throughout Sarawak 
following the 1962 Brunei Rebellion; the earliest indications of Indonesian 
political and armed support to the rebels soon alerted British officials to 
intensify control over all cross-border movements between Sarawak and 
Kalimantan. Gurkha patrols were stationed off the entire Sarawak coastline 
up to the upper reaches of the interior rivers to check on the movements of 
Indonesians. Despite mass deportations of Indonesians from other parts of 
Sarawak, the Apokayan Kenyah were evidently granted different treatment.38 
35  Personal communication with Jayl Langub, Kuching, March 2005.
36  See Pabit Enjok 1965.
37  Being a skilled musician and dancer, he became a regular Sarawak cultural envoy 
on Malaysian cultural missions overseas during the 1970s and 1980s (Langub 1997).
38  On deportations of Indonesian labour, see Sarawak Gazette (January 1964).
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We were longing for home, but we heard that Sarawak’s entire coastline was 
swarming with military checkpoints, all the way up to Kapit. We asked Tuan Rison 
(Tom Harrisson) for a clearance order that would waive us from all the checkpoints 
up to Long Nawang.39 We were the only (peselai) group who had managed to return 
safely to Long Nawang during the time of Konfrontasi, thanks to Tuan Rison. I think 
he wanted to pay back all the favours my elders had done for him during the war 
years. My elders were the ones who helped him, but it was through me that he repaid 
his gratitude. (Ubang Ding).40
The last peselai teams who managed to pass through Gurkha checkpoints were 
barely one month back home when they were sent back into Sarawak for a 
total different purpose. 
A group of approximately 200 Kenyah men from Long Nawang under the 
leadership of two Indonesian marine majors and additional auxiliary TNKU 
militias went to attack the Gurkha military outstation at the Uma’ Kulit village 
of Long Jawe in late September 1963.41 Many Kenyah men were told that 
their mission was to ‘liberate Brunei from the English colonizers’, though the 
destination was not disclosed until the parties were several kilometers upriver 
from Long Jawe. The Indonesian military leaders assured the Kenyah that the 
attack would not be directed against the Long Jawe population, whom the 
officers knew had still close kinship relations with the Apokayan Kenyah. 
Kenyah scouts of the raiding party were sent ahead and even managed to slip 
into the longhouses to warn about the impending attack so that no Kenyah 
would be in shooting range, which was to be directed towards the Gurkha 
outpost across the river. The attack was launched on 28 September 1963, 
and to the dismay of the attacking Kenyah, the Gurkhas also employed local 
Long Jawe Kenyah as border scouts, some of whom were killed that day. The 
raiding party intended to kidnap four of these scouts to prevent them from 
sounding the alarm. The military leaders, however, had decided that the 
captives should be executed on the spot against the wishes of the Kenyah team 
members. Two were silently helped by the Kenyah to escape. The deaths of 
the four Uma’ Kulit Kenyah border scouts, however, has already antagonized 
the Long Jawe populace.
Capt. Muljono brought us down from the Iwan. We had learned how to use the 
girin (Garand) gun. I was puzzled when we were not led back to Long Nawang, but 
entered the Pengian and Penasai River. When we were ordered to haul the canoes up 
the ridge, we suddenly knew that we were about to attack Sarawak. After reaching 
Long Iran we were told that we were about to attack the Gurkha outpost at Long 
Jawe. I felt awkward since I stayed at Long Jawe on my way from Sibu less then four 
months before. Some younger men in our party were excited. They had never been 
in a war before. It was very hard to maintain our party’s discipline and order. Only 
39  Tom Harrisson, still heading the Batu Niah excavations and the Museum back then, 
was appointed senior intelligence advisor to the British army stationed in Sarawak (Miri). He 
thus had authority or influence to issue such clearance orders. See Heimann 1998.
40  Interview with Ubang Ding, Long Nawang, February 2003.
41  Sarawak Tribune 2 October 1963 and 8 October 1963.
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one day before reaching Long Jawe, some young men couldn’t stand not shooting at 
some low flying birds. Others just thought it was another peselai expedition, like on 
that night before the raid, some even wanted to hunt for wild boar. The Captain, a 
Bugis, threatened to send those men back to Long Nawang.
I was sent ahead to inform the Long Jawe villagers about the impending attack, and 
to ensure that the right bank where the outpost was stationed would be cleared from 
our (Kenyah) people. I returned to our party who were already preparing to launch 
the attack. Everyone was hungry.
In the early morning hours we raided Long Jawe. I was ordered to shoot the radio 
tower. I wasn’t sure what happened after that, it was total chaos. We managed to 
overrun the Gurkha post, and the first thing I did was to open the storage where their 
rations were stored. I couldn’t believe seeing tins of biscuits. I began to open the tins 
and eating as much as I could, and I totally forgot about the fight. Someone had to 
pull me out from there.
We were forced to take, I think six captured Uma’ Kulit (Kenyah) border scouts with 
us, since we were not sure whether they would not alarm the other Gurkhas downriver. 
Back at Long Iran, two were executed by our military commanders. We had to bury 
them near the riverbank. We were uneasy about this. Some of these border scouts 
were still related to some men in our team. We silently released two of them that 
night, and reported to the Captain that they ran away. (Ibau Ncau).42
The vulnerability of inland borders to such cross-border raids led to a complete 
ban on upriver travel. Other Kenyah peselai teams who were held up by Gurkha 
patrols along the Balui River were, however, not forced into deportation, but 
were allowed to stay in Kayan and Kenyah villages close to the Belaga area 
until right after the Konfrontasi ended in 1966.43 In addition, in 1964, the Kapit 
Resident permitted 56 Apokayan Kenyah to continue to work on the Kapit 
airfield. Later they were joined by ”no less than two hundred in all”.44 In the 
Baram area, other groups were allowed to continue work under the protection 
of Temenggong Oyong Lawai Jau.45 Being held-up for prolonged periods, a 
number of peselai team members fell in love with local women, married, and 
naturalized, while others decided to invite their remaining families in the 
Apokayan to come over and settle in Sarawak. 
In other cases, peselai teams that were held-up by the travel ban began to 
open rice farms in the Balui, which precipitated later permanent migrations 
into Sarawak. One Badeng Kenyah peselai team from Long Betaoh was held up 
42  Interview with Ibau Ncau, Long Nawang, November 2006. See also Sarawak Tribune 
2 October 1963 and 6 November 1963.
43  Interview with Dato’ Tajang Laing, Kuching (March 2003), who was a member of the 
Council Negeri during the Konfrontasi period.
44  See Kapit District Annual Report Part II (July 1964) by Peter Tinggom (Sarawak Gazette 
31 August 1965: 253). It was the first occasion when Kenyah labour migrants were reported 
under the ‘Immigration’ issue header.
45  Temenggong Oyong Lawai Jau, M.B.E., a Kenyah, was the Paramount Chief of the 
Sarawak Orang Ulu, and Sarawak Council Negeri member. He had close relationship with 
Kenyah leaders in the Apokayan due to his Leppo’ Tau ancestry. Interview with PeLawai Asa, 
Nawang Baru (February 2003), who was working in the Baram during the Konfrontasi.
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in the Balui, and decided to open rice fields close to Long Iran while waiting 
for the travel ban to be lifted. In 1966, shortly after the Konfrontasi ended, 
they decided that basic needs were more accessible in Sarawak, and they 
invited their relatives in Indonesia to settle there. The Long Iran settlement 
soon grew (it was even reported in Sarawak’s 1968 health census – see Leigh 
[2002]), and later became the nucleus of the Badeng Kenyah settlement at 
Long Busang in 1969.46 
The Konfrontasi, and the 1963 Long Jawe raid in particular, left what many 
thought was a deep scar to community relations in the Rajang river basin as 
community leaders, particularly in Sarawak, felt that it was a serious breach 
to the sacred 1924 Kapit Peacemaking Agreement. Despite the official signing 
of peace and the normalisation of diplomatic ties between Indonesia and 
Malaysia in August 1966, high-level Sarawak politicians from both the Rajang 
and Balui thought that a separate transnational peacemaking agreement 
following the 1924 Kapit tradition should be arranged. Tajang Laing, a Balui 
Kayan and then Sarawak Forestry Minister, traveled up to Long Nawang in 
mid-1967 to make the necessary arrangements. The peacemaking agreement 
was to involve all the Iban, Kayan and Kenyah communities of the Rejang, 
Balui, and Kayan rivers following the 1924 Kapit peacemaking ceremony.47 
We wanted to arrange peace following our Kayan-Kenyah traditions. After all, we 
all originated from Indon. My own Kayan ancestors came from the Apokayan. I was 
maybe the only Sarawak official who personally knew many people from Long 
Nawang. That’s why I was sent out by (Temenggong) Jugah to go on a peacemaking 
mission to Long Nawang. So I went, but coming closer to the border, we were not too 
sure about how we would be received in Long Nawang. We went up the Iran River 
and waited just at the border. We luckily met two Kenyah from Long Nawang, and 
we asked them to summon the leaders of the Apokayan to meet us on the border. I 
told them that we all have breached our forefathers’ peace agreement, and that we 
should arrange the peacemaking at Long Jawe. I was relieved when they accepted. 
(Tajang Laing, 2003).48
Meanwhile, Temenggong Jugah, who was then the Federal Minister for 
Sarawak Affairs, secured 10,000 Malaysian Dollars from the Malaysian Prime 
Minister, Tunku Abdul Rahman, to fund the ceremony. The peacemaking 
ceremony itself was considered anti-climactic by Temenggong Jugah, who 
apparently missed the spearing of pigs which was a tradition under Brooke 
rule. One reason why the old custom could not be followed was that the 
majority of the Apokayan Kenyah had already become Christian and shunned 
”pagan” rituals (Sutlive 1992). The Long Jawe peacemaking agreement was 
however not free from new statist considerations, as Sutlive (1992: 215-216) 
wrote:
46  Interview with PeAsan Lusat, Long Busang, Feb. 2003. PeAsan was a member of this 
initial peselai team held up in the Balui.
47  Interview with Dato’ Tajang Laing, Kuching, March 2003.
48  Interview with Dato’ Tajang Laing, Kuching, March 2003.
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He (Temenggong Jugah) then consulted with Gerunsin Lembat, at that time the State 
Secretary, about procedures for a ceremony. Both men recognized that as soon as such 
a ceremony was held, there would be a large movement of people from Kalimantan 
into Sarawak where economic conditions were better, creating a problem of refugees. 
Gerunsin discouraged Jugah from holding such a ceremony, but Jugah was adament.
Despite Gerunsin’s objections, the way trans-basin relations overruled statist 
considerations came to the test when, in 1969, soon after the peacemaking was 
completed, thirteen Badeng Kenyah longhouses migrated from Long Betaoh 
in the Apokayan into the Balui:
As Jugah and Gerunsin had anticipated, one of the results of the ceremony was the 
mass migration of more than 2,000 of these Kenyah into Sarawak. The two men worked 
with appropriate government departments in the resettlement and the registration 
of these new citizens. (Sutlive 1992: 218).
The timber boom: becoming illegal (but licit) aliens
Following the end of the Konfrontasi, massive peselai expeditions commenced, 
but this time they raised concerns with Indonesian government officials. 
Fearing that peselai expeditions would become the pretexts for permanent 
migrations into Sarawak, coupled with significant shortages of labour in the 
Apokayan caused by the absence of a large number of men during prolonged 
peselai episodes between 1968-1969, the Government in 1970 limited the 
number of peselai participants allowed move on a single Pass Djalan to a 
maximum of 20 persons.49 There was a brief diversion of peselai activities in the 
early 1970s to banjir kap logging activities in East Kalimantan’s lower Kayan 
area. These small-scale logging activities ended as soon as the Indonesian 
Army’s Special Forces (RPKAD) took over the banjir kap business.50
Sarawak’s increased timber industry expansion since 1974, prompted by 
the Federal takeover of Sarawak’s state oil revenues, attracted a new influx 
of Indonesian labour, including an increased influx of peselai groups. These 
groups also included members who originated from Kenyah settlements that 
had migrated out of the Apokayan.51 New logging technologies, such as the 
utilization of tractors (lipan) and chainsaws, changed the processes of labour 
recruitment significantly. No longer in need of the mass labour that the kuda-
kuda (manual hauling) system required, logging camp recruiters broke up 
peselai teams into smaller units once they arrived in major logging towns. 
49  See Whittier (1973: 133-134).
50  Interview with Tamen Baun, Long Nawang, May 2000. Banjir kap logging was a 
smallholder timber extraction activity whereby upriver communities sold logs to downstream 
timber purchasers – this is carried out by marking their logs and letting them float downstream 
during high water levels. After a period they would come down to collect payments, calculated 
on log quantities marked by each feller. After a short while, the RPKAD (Resimen Para Komando 
Angkatan Darat – since 1985 renamed to KOPASSUS / Komando Pasukan Khusus) took over the 
role as log purchasers. The RPKAD was widely accused for cheating by erasing log marks.
51  The political economy of Sarawak’s timber industry has been exhaustively examined 
by Amarjit Kaur (1998a), Majid-Cook (1999), and Jomo et al. (2004).
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Single groups were often broken up and dispersed to different employers. 
Losing contact, it became increasingly difficult for smaller teams to hook up 
and organize the journey back home. It would be arduous for five persons, for 
example, to paddle and haul purchased goods through treacherous waterways 
back to the border. Similar to what happened during the Konfrontasi, many 
men ended up settling permanently in Sarawak, or in many cases, peselai 
durations often stretched beyond the one to three year periods.52 
All during the mid-1970s, peselai teams began to experience the effects 
of the tightening of immigration controls, marked by the increase of police 
checks at major logging towns, such as Sibu, Bintulu, and Miri. It was during 
the 1980s when local Sarawakians, mainly Ibans, Kayans and local Kenyah, 
started to gradually pull out of hazardous positions in logging jobs (that is, 
chainsaw operators), which further compounded labour shortages in the 
logging industry.53 Employers turned towards the eager surplus of Indonesian 
workers. While legal Indonesian Javanese, Malay, and Bugis workers filled 
the gaps in the downriver sawmill and plywood industries, vacancies in the 
more hazardous upriver logging jobs were filled by undocumented Torajans, 
Iban, Kenyah, and Kayan workers from Indonesia. Driven by profit, upriver 
logging camps preferred employing undocumented workers. 
Nationwide Malaysian police raids on illegal migrants, starting with 
Nyah (‘Get Rid Off’) Operations in the mid-1980s, restricted Kenyah labour 
migrations from heavily patrolled urban areas. Nonetheless, many Indonesian 
Kenyah could pass off as local Sarawakians as police officers were usually 
unable to distinguish them from the local Kenyah populace. Some even cut 
their hair in traditional Kenyah fashion to blend in.54 In addition, significant 
proportions of the local Sarawak populace did not possess Identity Cards 
themselves. The ongoing citizen registration process in upriver areas was an 
opportunity for Indonesian Kenyah migrants to naturalize with the help of 
local Kenyah hosts acting as guarantors. Tajang Laing, a local Kayan politician 
with links to Kenyah leaders in the Apokayan, accordingly provided 200 
Indonesian Bakung Kenyah plantation workers at Sepakau with Sarawak 
Identity cards around 1985.55 Following nationwide crackdowns on illegal 
immigrants, the role of Sarawak Kenyahs and politicians who had personal 
or kinship relations with peselai team members became more prominent in 
providing protective measures against police checks. This, however, placed 
many Apokayan Kenyah in asymmetrical power relations with their Sarawak 
kin through indebtedness.
52  Interview with Jakob Udau and Balan Laban at Uma Nyaving, Sungai Asap (March 
2003); Garau Dian, Tasa Jok, PeLah Along and PeBit Ncau, Long Mekaba, December 2002. 
53  Inadequate insurance and compensation rendered logging jobs more and more 
unattractive in the face of better jobs that Sarawakians could find in urban areas. See also 
Majid-Cooke (1999). 
54  The traditional Kenyah hairstyle is marked by a long pigtail. This has gone out of 
fashion in Kalimantan since the 1960s, but was preserved among the Sarawak Kenyah until 
quite recently. 
55  Interview with Dato’ Tajang Laing, Kuching, March 2003.
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Two developments significantly altered the socio-economic relationship 
between the Apokayan Kenyah and Sarawak. First, the successive timber 
booms in Sarawak, which peaked in the 1970s and onwards marginalized 
the longstanding trade of jungle products into and out of Sarawak. Losing 
one of their primary economic niches, the Apokayan Kenyah’s role in the 
Sarawak economy was relegated to supplying the pool of labour under the 
vast hierarchy of the timber industries. In addition to being relegated to 
the lower strata of the production hierarchy, the increased formalization of 
the Malaysian-Indonesian border in the 1980s categorised them as ‘illegal 
migrants’ without access to insurance and labour rights. It is no longer safe 
for Apokayan Kenyah to enter towns in Sarawak to cash in their wages at 
local banks without running the risk of being apprehended by increasingly 
frequent police checks in downriver regions. They often have to rely on camp 
canteen managers to cash the money for them, subject to a 5% commission.
Hitching on logging pickup cars is not always a convenient undertaking. 
Sarawak Iban drivers, higher in the ranks within the camp hierarchy, often 
refuse to take Apokayan Kenyah workers on their rides unless they pay a 
hefty fee of RM 50 (although camp regulations explicitly forbid any form of 
payments or bribes made for the utilizing of logging vehicles). 
Their insecure status as illegal migrants has also affected the preferences 
of cross-border marriages. It was common up to the early 1980s for Apokayan 
man to marry Sarawakian women. By the 1990s, cross-border marriage rates 
in Central Borneo had gone down. Even among the small numbers of recent 
marriages, the trend has reversed in Sarawakian man marrying Indonesian 
women.56 
Younger Apokayan generations who arrive in Sarawak today have scant 
geographic knowledge of village locations and rivers. Confined to logging 
camps, they have little contact with the outside world. Although the extensive 
logging roads have made travelling around Sarawak, especially to logging 
towns much easier, they no longer meander through the traditional cluster of 
Kenyah and Kayan villages that used to function as transit sites, social safety 
nets, and sites for socializing.
From riverine to terrestrial space ordering: the new 
“borders”
The history of Kenyah mobility into Sarawak illustrates the changing nature 
of space ordering since the arrival of colonial states and the resulting impact 
it has had on cross-border social relations and the emergence of state border 
regimes. The early Sarawak state under the Brookes chose to insert itself 
56  For example, in the village of Long Mekaba, a Kenyah settlement in the Baram, there 
was a time around 1978 when six Indonesian Kenyah man managed legally to marry women 
from the local populace. Only one cross-border marriage occurred in 2000 when a Sarawak 
Kenyah man married an Indonesian Kenyah woman, but because the bride did not have a birth 
certificate or a passport, the Sarawak authorities refused to legalize the marriage. (Interview 
with Ingkong Lahang and William Ukeng, Long Mekaba, January 2003.)
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within the indigenous riverine-based social order. It did so by improving 
social relations between riverine communities that extended from Sarawak’s 
west coast up to the Apokayan in Dutch Borneo. Peace in the interior was 
viewed as a pre-requisite to a booming trade in forest products which was 
essential for the Sarawak economy. By basing itself on this riverine-based 
governance over space, the Brookes considered the Apokayan and its Kenyah 
inhabitants as an integral Sarawak social and economic space. This entailed 
that Sarawak had little interest in exercising control over the Anglo-Dutch 
international boundary, which paid little respect to the social-cultural and 
economic continuums that transcended the border. This longstanding riverine 
space order existed well into the transitionary period under British rule (1946-
1963). The Kenyah of the Apokayan were not regarded as ”Indonesians” or 
”aliens”, even in the midst of the Konfrontasi.
Conditions started to change with the resurgence of Sarawak’s logging 
industry, which spread inwards to the interior after the Konfrontasi had ended 
in the late 1960s. The logging industry, Sarawak’s major revenue earner, is 
basically a terrestrial enterprise that partitions lands into neatly bounded 
concession areas. The accessibility to timber reserves requires the introduction 
of new modes of transportation and infrastructure such as trucks, pickups, 
and land roads. The extensive network of logging roads not only changed 
the physical landscape throughout Sarawak, but also increasingly shifted 
social organization away from the quasi-egalitarian order of river basins to 
the highly hierarchized world of logging camps. 
It is within this hierarchized world of logging camps where the ”border” 
is experienced. Far from being a territorial border, the border that separates 
Indonesians from Sarawakians is manifested through everyday life 
experiences: payments to Iban drivers, the small prospective of finding a 
Sarawakian spouse, wage differences, illegal deductions from salaries, and 
the limited access to their social world in general. The border is manifested 
through hierarchical power relations.
Conclusions
The traditional mobility patterns practiced by certain societies that may now be 
deemed ”illicit” may be rooted in ancient trade routes that may have been the 
most efficient links between supply regions and regional markets. These very 
same routes are probably as efficient today as they were in the past, serving 
the same purpose under contemporary capitalist modes of development. 
Capitalism requires an efficient order of hierarchical space that is relatively 
autonomous from the inefficiency of national space orders on one side, and 
natural barriers on the other. With the blurring between nation-state and 
corporate interests, the most effective border regime to support this would 
be a model that operates on hierarchical rather than territorial/spatial logic. 
This would entail the containment of people not through spatial partitions 
and borders, but through their containment within fixed hierarchies of 
capitalist production. The Kenyah have been subjected to new regimes of class 
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relations, embedded in the encounter of structured labour hierarchies and in 
the emerging inscription of national identity within their social space, which 
has increasingly been reduced to a workplace. The two historical trajectories 
of the nation state and capitalism have found a working equilibrium in this 
encounter. 
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